This paper introduces an ordinal rational choice model for multiple kinds of social participation intensities to empirically investigate the relevance of several theoretical determinants of formation of Social Capital (SC) introduced in the literature. The framework is rich enough to investigate the importance of demographic individual variables, social/peer effects interactions, endogenous trust, and politico-institutional factors as sources of participation. Using Chilean data, we find that politico-institutional factors are jointly important to account for SC formation, as well as social interactions. Trusting community is a highly significant factor behind political participation and non-participation in religious activities. In addition, there are clear interrelated decisions among different kinds of participation. The evidence shows that SC formation is a multidimensional complex process, as advocated by prevailing theories in the literature.
Introduction
Even though Social Capital (SC) is a fertile area of research, the importance of its multiple determinants is not fully understood and the main mechanisms behind its formation remain largely untested. An extensive literature presents little consensus on the relevant processes originating SC (Davidson-Schmich 2006) as well as its appropriate measurement. 1 Building on several insights from the literature, our first contribution is to construct and estimate an eclectic empirical model, taking into account several parameter identification and statistical issues generally overlooked in the literature. We apply our general setup to Chilean data to understand several complex aspects of SC formation in that country. Moreover, we test whether some of the factors stressed in the theoretical discussion are empirically relevant to explain the phenomenon in Chile.
An eclectic view of literature portrays SC as a complex and multidimensional phenomenon.
There are numerous relevant concepts about creation or formation, and complicated interconnected issues on its effects. Given the complexity and extent of the existing approaches, we choose to incorporate in our empirical model some substantial aspects of SC that are stressed by previous literature. First, we focus on investment in Social Capital via participation in social activities, a channel notably advocated by Putnam(1993 Putnam( , 1995 . We view this kind of investment as an optimal decision problem, given individual preferences. Second, since individual attitudes and behavior are structured both by personal traits and social context, we incorporate the possibility of social effects of individual decisions, i.e. participation choices may have (positive) externalities on community life (Manski 1993; Durlauf 2002) . Third, we introduce general trust (Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; Newton 2006; Geys and Murdoch 2008) as a key motivating aspect in social participation, and explicitly deal with its endogenous nature. Fourth, we formally consider the political and institutional designs as prime elements in the process of SC formation, both as driving forces for certain forms of associative life, as well as a chief factor explaining trust (Kim 2005; Freitag 2006 ). Finally, we recognize another layer of complexity in the choices of associational life by analyzing several kinds of social participation linked to fundamental areas of human life (religious activities, local community -neighborhood, parental association, professional association, and political movements).
Studying Chilean SC formation process is interesting by itself, but also sheds light on the determinants and mechanisms behind the social development of a country which is making a transition from Latin-American standards to the ones achieved by OECD countries. 2 As a case of study, the SC formation process in Chile may help understand the cultural and social development transition towards development. This article focuses on the processes of SC formation at the sub national context, with explicit consideration of individual and local government (municipality) level heterogeneity and cross-interactions. In this way, we avoid the frequent criticism of SC research neglecting the importance of governmental institutions (Oxendine et al. 2007) . In contrast to aggregate national data studies, our framework considers local context variables which are potentially important to explain SC formation (Freitag 2006) . Our focus on the local government level is justified by several studies suggesting that people are more connected and committed to the policies at local community rather than those of the central government ( On technical grounds, we construct a model as a linear approximation for a standard utility maximization problem of social participation intensity depending on individual, social and institutional and political variables. Then, we show how to include social interactions in the fashion of Durlauf (2002) in order to consider possible externalities of individual decisions on SC formation.
We also explicitly incorporate institutional factors of the municipality in which the individual lives as a way to uncover variables that spur or deter associative life. Our model also deals with the relationship between social participation and trust, considering the endogeneity or reverse causality problem. As identification strategy, we rely on an exogenous instrumental variable, being a crime victim, which affects individual's trust with no direct effects on social participation, conditional on socioeconomic background and municipality characteristics. Finally, we deal with the ordinal Our results show that all the mechanisms of SC formation are significant, although the particular relevance of each element varies from one kind of social participation to another. These findings confirm the complexity of the creation of , and show that our approach contributes to systematize the empirical knowledge on the subject. Our results show that the causal effect of trust is positive for political participation, but negative for religious activities. Most participation activities have a clear gender bias. While females participate more in religious, parental and community activities, males are more involved in professional and political activities. Age plays particular roles for different kinds of activities. Participation intensity in religious activities increases in age, while there are hump shaped profiles for other activities, peaking at different ages.
Among politico-institutional factors, most of them are not individually significant at conventional levels. Remarkable exceptions are the negative impact of our efficiency measure in community and professional activities, the positive impact of the municipality expenditure in civic organizations for political participation. In addition, the political party of the incumbent major plays a significant role for community and political participation. Despite of the lack of individual significance, we reject the null hypothesis of no social/peer interactions. In addition, we also reject the null of no politico-institutional factors. Finally, unobserved factors driving participation are significantly correlated one to another. All in all, the evidence is concordant with a multidimensional and heterogeneous complex process of SC formation, as advocated by prevailing theories in the literature. Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990) influential studies about SC initiated a very large literature.
Literature Background
The research agenda highlights the complex relationships among civic engagement, social structures (associations, social networks), the norms of cooperation and reciprocity, and the trust in general, in socio-economic development and political processes (Putnam 1993; Maloney et al. 2008) . While some researchers, mainly economists, have investigated SC impact on specific contexts such as economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997) , among other economic outcomes (Guiso et al. 2004; David et al. 2010; Freitag and Kirchner 2011) , others have stressed SC as a remedy for most problems that affect the modern democracies (Putnam 1995; Kim 2005) . Along this line of research, SC formation could revitalize participation, governability, and sustainable socio-economic development.
In methodological terms, many studies compare statistics within a country or across groups of countries and develop multilevel empirical strategies (Welzel et al. 2005) . These papers incorporate individual-level data from surveys, as well as economic, political and institutional context variables (Letki 2006) . While these studies agree on the existence of multilevel structure and provide empirical evidence regarding the relationship between micro, meso and macro SC dynamics, only Keele (2005) presents a simple macro model to explain the dynamics of SC in a cross national perspective. Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Glaeser et al. (2002) adopt a viewpoint that is similar to ours, by focusing is individual-level evidence on SC formation. For the Chilean case, Salazar and Jaime (2009) study participation in social organizations, following a very different approach and using other data. To the best of our knowledge, our study is unique in developing an empirical model of SC creation including both individual and sub national levels, and fully acknowledging endogeneity, identification issues and the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon.
Since Alexis de Tocqueville, the associative life has been considered a relevant factor for the democracy and other dimensions of development. Associative life generates active citizens and becomes the main vehicle for coordinating joint actions, among many other positive outcomes (Wallis and Dollery 2006; Anderson 2009; Onyx et al. 2012 ). SC formation is usually measured as the degree of involvement in participation and associativism. Many researchers have related this to positive effects on civic attitudes, trust, and subjective consequences of social networks (Putnam 1993; Von Erlach 2005; Freitag et al. 2009 ). Moreover, many studies consider associative life as the appropriate subject of study in cross national and sub national comparative research (Wagle 2006; Freitag 2006; Lee 2010; Menahem et al. 2011) . Although different types of association may generate different outputs, as shown in the debate about "bonding" and "bridging" types of association (Putnam 2000, pp 22-23, Geys and Murdoch 2008) , there is no conclusive evidence on particular effects from specific participation kinds (Maloney et al. 2008 ). Since we focus on several participation kinds in the paper, we discuss this topic in light of our empirical results in the subsection 5.2.
Since the decade of 1960s, studies of political culture have focused on attitudes and trust beliefs that of groups, organizations and individuals as a resource for democracy (Maloy 2009). Research on SC proposes trust as a basis for achieving social, economic and political goals. Some studies try to measure its effects on other components of SC (Keele 2005; Bjørnskov 2006; Jamal and Nooruddin 2010) . However, the direction of causality between trust and participation could run in both ways.
Indeed many researches emphasize the "virtuous circle" between trust and participation as key conception in SC (Putnam 1993; Brehm and Rahn 1997) .Dealing with this problem usually relies on the use of instrumental variables (IV) that provide quasi experimental exogenous variation to allow disentangling one causality direction. 6
The inclination to participate depends on resources and possibilities varying according to demographic variables such as gender, age, education, among others. In order to capture these factors, the literature include socio-demographic factors at the individual level as predictors or control variables to explain participation and civic engagement (Von Erlach 2005; Behtoui 2007; Morjé and Gilbert 2008) . In addition, the social context and the information environment influence individuals' behaviors. For instance, Campbell (2009) shows that the status related to the educational level is related to average education within the social environment.
Since John Stuart Mill, many researchers argue that one of the main functions of institutions and the governments is the formation of people's moral quality and desirable intelligence. Having this insight as a remote ancestor, many theoretical and empirical studies show the impact that political design and institutions have on the formation of SC (Freitag 2006 (Boudreau 2009 ) that influence world views and preferences. In this context, several studies have converged on the implication of institutions at the local level for social outputs (Esau 2007) , or as source of environments which may allow for the creation of SC (Boeck and Fleming 2005) . Some experimental studies have examined the effects of public policies and social programs in the perceptions and behaviors of people in local communities (Richey 2005; Andrews et al. 2011) . From the case studies and comparative research literature on governance there are evidence about the effects of institutional structures, constraints and designs for citizen empowerment, too (Gaynor 2011; Wampler 2012) .
Social Capital: Conceptualization and Hypotheses
In this study, we see Social Capital as a group of actual and potential resources, individuals and collective groups that come out of connections, social relationships, "durable network of relationships", and the processes of material and symbolic exchanges (Bourdieu 1980, p 1-3; Coleman 1990 , p. 304-305, Migheli (2011 ).
On the other hand, Robert Putnam underlines the economic and political benefits obtained by associativism. In his research about SC in Italy, Putnam (1993) concludes that institutions and 6 There are virtually endless number of papers in empirical economics using this approach. In Political Science, these techniques are used and discussed in Dunning (2008) , Pacheco and Lange (2010) and Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) . For a technical discussion, see Morgan and Winship (2007) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) political systems are formed by the historical and social context in which they operate. From this perspective, he highlights the positive role of associativism, "the civic community", that encourages an active, egalitarian, public-oriented citizenry and is truly a cooperation and "trust factory".
Consequently, associations and the levels of associational membership are considered a standard to observe stocks of SC. In line with these insights, a good part of the subsequent literature conceptualizes SC as structures and social networks (associative life), and norms of cooperation and trust with positive effects on several socioeconomic outcomes (Knack 2002; Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Maloney et al. 2008) . We adopt a similar approach, using a particular measurement advocated in Putnam's work: participation intensity in a variety of social activities as a quantification of the individual's involvement in social networks. Bourdieu and Coleman support the notion of rational decisions in regards to associative life. We develop and interpret our empirical model in this research tradition of Economics and Political Science (Penn 2009 ). Unsurprisingly, the economic literature on SC has stressed the rational cost-benefit choice of participation and social network formation (Glaeser et al. 2002) .
Following the literature about the impact of social contexts on Social Capital, some studies in sociology stress the fact that SC is more than the mere sum of individuals' choices of social participation. Hence, individual social participation decisions generate externalities that affect other members on their communities because they change the size and the configuration of the social network in which others would choose to participate. As Durlauf (2002) , we conceptualize these externalities in a similar fashion as the "peer effects" literature in economics starting with the seminal work of Manski (1993) . We formally test for the presence of such effects in our model. In Chile, as in other countries public policies are linked to citizen engagement, democratic representation of social interests at different stages of local policies Valdivieso (2012) . There is some evidence on the effect of political designs, institutions and public services on the formation of SC (Freitag 2006; Letki 2006) . The theoretical expectation is that institutional features and policies impact the individual participation in civil organizations with programmatic purposes, such as community, professional and political organizations. In particular, we focus on measures of budgetary independence, social program subsidies, investment in social organizations, consensus/majority democracy, efficiency, and political party of the incumbent major.
Starting with Coleman's insight that creating-value community networks are the base for SC (Coleman 1990, p.311-312) 
Modeling Participation using Utility Index
Participating in social activities entails benefits and costs. Along the lines of Bourdieu (1980) and Coleman (1990) , individuals obtain emotional, social and pecuniary gains through the increased interaction in social networks. These benefits may also include satisfaction derived from expressing identity with collective interests Jones (2009 
Assuming that the benefit function B(P ; X, Y ) is increasing and strictly concave, and that the cost function C(p; X, Y ) is increasing and convex 7 , the optimal choice implies that marginal benefit equals marginal cost of participation intensity. Hence,
The latter condition implicitly defines an optimal choice of intensity depending on X and Y , i.e
The solution is depicted graphically in Figure 1 . The benefits of participation intensity grow at a decreasing rate reflecting the fact that individuals who intensively participate in a social organization obtain little additional gains from increasing their involvement. The net utility obtained from participation activities has a bliss point, which defines the optimal individual behavior, given X and Y . Hence, the formation of SC can be represented through a utility index that is monotonically correlated with the observed degree of participation. For various reasons presented elsewhere (Valdivieso 1998) , individuals are naturally inclined to participate and cooperate, but face opportunity costs that could vary according to individual characteristics and to the politic and institutional context. Using a simple linear approximation for P (X, Y ) we can write as
Technically, we also require that B(P ; X, Y ) and C(P ; X, Y ) are twice continuously differentiable. 
Incorporating social effects
Manski (1993) seminal paper presents an empirical model with social interactions to model situations in which social behavior influences individual behavior. Thus, in our setup an individual is more likely participate in a community where participation is already high because he benefits from the large existing social network. We incorporate the latter consideration by introducing aggregate participation as a right-hand side variable
Individuals have rational expectations, that is, they make the best possible forecast using all the information available. We assume that (i) the fact that individual participation is determined 8 Our results should be interpreted as a reduced form of the effects of several exogenous variables on participation, including side-effects on earnings.
by equation (1) is common knowledge, and (ii) the information set Ω m(i) known by the individual Y m(i) ). Therefore, a rational individual computes the expected participation value as
Substituting back into the first equation yields
The presence of municipality averages of individual characteristics provides us a simple way to test the presence of social interactions (Manski 1993) . The fact that population characteristics matter for individual choices is an indication of externalities in the process of SC formation. Individual participation intensity choice changes the incentives other individuals face to determine their own participation intensity. The proposed model expresses an equilibrium situation in which (i) individuals make their decisions taking into account the best assessment (rational expectation) of the aggregate participation intensity, and (ii) the aggregate participation behavior is fully consistent with the individuals' participation choices.
Introducing social trust
On one hand, an individual's trust in others is a main determinant of social participation because it raises the expected payoff a person could obtain in their associative lives. On the other hand, subjective individual trust does not arise in social isolation. The odds for developing a trusty attitude towards others depend on the chances of interacting with reliable people in social networks.
Hence, it is hard to empirically uncover the relationship between social participation and trust because they mutually cause each other. Our identification strategy follows the standard approach of Instrumental Variables. 9 In a nutshell, we need to find a variable Z that provide us a quasiexperimental source of variation for trust. Formally, two conditions must be satisfied:
• Conditional exclusion restriction or validity: Conditional on observable individual and municipal information, the variable Z affects the level of trust, but does not affect the participation directly, i.e. all the variation of participation caused by Z comes through a trust variation.
In practice, this condition means that the variable Z is excluded from the equation of participation intensity.
• Strength: The variable Z is significantly correlated with trust T .
9 For a textbook treatment of this subject, see Morgan and Winship (2007) , Angrist and Pischke (2009) We postulate that a natural candidate for an exogenous variation is an indicator of being a crime victim, conditional on individual and municipal demographic and socioeconomic factors. The literature of SC has already used crime experiences to explain trust (Lederman et al. 2005; Keele 2005; Córdova 2007 ), so that this is factor generates an exogenous variation of trust with consequences in social participation intensity.
In this case, validity implies that, conditional on individual and municipality characteristics, all changes in social participation intensity generated by being a crime victim are entirely due to the impact on general trust caused by the crime event. Despite the crucial importance of this assumption for the method, it cannot be statistically tested, only defended on theoretical grounds (Morgan and Winship 2007) . In this case, our main argument goes as follows. Considering individuals who share the same observable features (gender, age, education, etc) and live in the same municipality at the same time, being a crime victim is driven just by luck.
Admittedly, the most problematic part is that any effect on participation caused by a crime experience must only come through a reduced level of trust. One counterargument could be that experiencing a crime may directly affect participation due to the economic loses generated. Nevertheless, most of the types of participation require little economic resources, but only personal time and effort. Since we control for municipal characteristics, age, and education, the socioeconomic status of and individual is held constant after being a crime victim. Moreover, intrinsic motivations seem to be fundamental to explain participation in associations (Degli Antoni 2009).
In the last fifteen years the theoretical and applied literature have stressed the Weak Instruments problem (Stock et al. 2002) . Whether instruments are weak or not can be formally tested, once defined an acceptable level of bias in the IV estimation (Stock and Yogo 2005) . Even though these insights do not directly carry over to our non-linear approach, we will show that being a crime victim is a strong predictor of trust level.
Using these ideas, we have the following two-equation model
Considering ordinal responses
While utility-maximizing behavior generates a continuous participation intensity decision, the collected data of participation mostly comes in discrete variables. For instance, the data from LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) used in this paper categorizes the participation activity into four possible answers ( "Once a week", "One or twice a month", "Once or twice a year", "Never"). Considering that these discrete choices are logically ordered through an underlying intensity of response, we can use an ordered probit model if we allow for a normal random component into the utility index. Hence, we observe intensity categories that allow us to uncover the unobserved continuous participation intensity. The thresholds determining in which category lies a particular participation intensity are parameters to be estimated. We can easily adapt our linear continuous framework and social/peer effects under the assumptions that (i) individuals are truly affected by the aggregate participation intensity (which is unobservable to the researcher), and (ii) individuals have rational expectations of participation intensity.
The trust variable T is also an ordinal random variable which prevent us from using linear IV estimation methods. If we would do that, the estimation were not invariant to the arbitrary numerical labels of the categories. Assuming joint normality of errors on the participation and trust equations, 
Considering multiple participation categories
There are several kinds of social organizations of great interest in LAPOP data. These are religious activities, parental associations, community/neighborhood organizations, professional associations, and political movements. Since and individual simultaneously decides participation intensity in each category, these choices are obviously interrelated. In principle, these several types may be complements or substitutes. Participation in certain activities may reduce costs or increase the benefits of participation in other types. Of course, to some extent all activities may be substitutes since the amount of time and resources of individuals is limited.
We pursue a reduced-form and flexible approach in dealing with these multiple simultaneous choices. We allow for free contemporaneous correlations across participation equations and the trust equation. This implies that we deal with a 6-dimensional multinomial recursive ordered probit model. As shown in the Appendix, this implies a numerical computation of a 5-dimensional integral.
We estimate the model via Simulated Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (SLIML) using numerical integration using GHK ( Moreover, our main purpose is to test the existence of social interaction effects on participation decisions. Manski (1993) and Durlauf (2002) show that we can test for these effects in equation (3) even if we cannot identify the parameter δ by studying the joint significance of the parameters associated to X m(i) . We report the shares of individuals in each category of participation or trust for the whole sample and selected subsamples.
Empirical Results

Data Sources and Variables
A majority of individuals choose not to participate. Roughly 60% of individuals do not participate in any religious activity. These numbers reach 65%, 69%, 72% and 97% for parental associations, community, professional, and political activities, respectively. The participation intensity across the three other participation categories is unevenly split. While low, medium, and high levels of religion participation categories roughly have similar shares, other activities look very different.
A majority of individuals engaged in parental associations do it at the medium intensity level.
Conditional on participation, most individuals choose low and medium participation in community, professional, and political activities.
There are clear gender patterns in participation as well. While women predominate at religious, parental, and community activities, male participate more in professional and political categories.
Age matters too. Religious participation and participation intensity clearly increase with age.
Parental association participation depicts an inverse U-shape that peaks at 35-44 years old, a standard life-cycle pattern of parenthood. Community committee participation increases with age before 65, but intensity seems larger for individuals in the 35-44 and 55-64 years old. For professional associations, quite stable for age groups above 24. Political movement participation shows an hump shaped pattern peaking at 35-44 years old.
In regards to trust in community people, most individuals say that common people is somewhat trustworthy (39.8%, category 3) or little trustworthy (28.8%, category 2). Around 10% of the sample believe that people is no trustworthy (category 4). The data shows a clear increase of trustworthiness from 2008 to 2010. Gender differences in trust attitudes are subtle: women tend to be polarized in their answers, while the modal male is somewhat trustworthy (45.2%, category 3). Age patterns are hard to summarize in a sentence. Total lack of trust is quite constant across ages, although it is slightly lower for individuals 25-34 and older than 55. The "Very trustworthy"
category shows an increasing pattern in age, with a remarkable large increase for people older than 65. The "Little" decreases in age, while "Somewhat" shows an increasing pattern.
Municipal demographic data:
To test for the existence of social interaction effects or participation externalities, we need data on average demographic characteristics such as gender, education, etc. at the municipality level. We obtain these variables from the 2006 and 2009 CASEN surveys, although the measurement of these variables is not perfectly contemporaneous with LAPOP individual-level variables. If there is measurement error on these variables due to the lagged nature of variables or due to the sampling error of CASEN data, our estimates would be biased towards zero. Hence, finding significant social effects would be noticeably in this context.
The last subtable of Table 2 In the Chilean local context, two issues affecting participation are the budgetary self-funding capacity of municipalities 13 and the resources allocated to strengthen public programs, services,
13 Chilean municipalities receive funding from their own territorial taxes, commercial and drivers' licences, among other sources. A handful of wealthy municipalities support a Common Municipal Fund (CMF), which is redistributed to the rest of municipalities of the country.
social organizations, and participation at the local level. We expect that the control over own resources increases the autonomy of municipalities and makes it possible for them to focus on local priorities, spurring the participation in social organizations. Moreover, the economic resources for social organizations encourage participation. The greater the resources for organizations, the greater the incentives for people to participate in associative life. In Table 2 We also hypothesize that managerial efficiency of municipalities fosters social participation. the dispersion of growth rates shows a slight decline, suggesting an overall increased performance of the municipal educational system during the period.
Estimation and Results
The estimation procedure is implemented using the LIML procedure through the cmp package created by Roodman (2009) groups which follow the guidelines of church leaders (Hagopian 2008) . In that scenario, other channels for social integration may be reduced as religious participation increases. Hence, for members of these groups, distrust may arise as a predominant approach to the rest of the society.
This tension is probably increasing over time since the Chilean governments have increasingly favored a secular orientation in public education, taking away the traditional influence of Catholic Church in this area.
Older people tend to participate more in religious activities, as we anticipate from the descriptive statistics. This kind of participation increasing in age is in line with a life-cycle hypothesis:
individuals facing an increasing chance of death for their family and friends, as well as themselves, may find psychological relief for uncertainty in afterlife beliefs advocated by Christians and other religions. Another competing explanation is the cohort hypothesis: older people were raised in a society in which the Church had much greater influence than it has today. Since the squared-age term is non-significant, and the implied peak of religious participation is around 110.5 years old 18 , it is not possible to discern between the two hypotheses.
Average subsidies have a positive significative influence on religious participation. We interpret this result as evidence for an important role of religious associations in information diffusion and advising with respect to procedures to obtain assistance in the community. People perceive that the chances for obtaining subsidies increase when they are supported by organizations. In particular, religious ones seem to play a large role in this process. On the other hand, our efficiency proxy affects negatively this category. This finding is consistent with a substitution pattern between local governments and religious organizations in the provision of some community services, particularly education. is not a good description of Chilean educational system, parents often organize to enhance school performance in several aspects.
Community Committees:
In regards to participation in "Committee meetings to improve community" in Tables 3-4 , we find evidence of significantly lower male participation intensity, as well as greater intensity for married individuals. The effect of having a life partner (but not married) is positive, significant, and larger than the one associated to married. Urbanity also increases participation intensity. Older individuals significantly significantlyparticipate with greater intensity although the life-cycle profile has hump-shaped pattern peaking at age 66.7. Trust in community does not increase participation at this particular dimension. Aggregate demographic variables at municipality level are not individually significant.
Some politico-institutional variables have an individually significant effect. Having a major of the Renovación Nacional party increases this sort of participation at 5% of significance. This may be explained by the fact that RN has have a relative greater decentralization with respect to other Chilean political parties (Joignant 2010). The percentage variation of test scores at municipal schools, has a significantly negative impact on community participation. A possible explanation is that major inefficiency motivates citizens to organize themselves in order to remedy neighborhood problems, or to demand better public goods to the local or central government.
Professional Associations: Participation intensity in "professional, merchants, producers, and farmers associations" is significantly higher for urban individuals. The effect of age describes a significantly inverse-U shape profile peaking at age 43.4.. Education also shows a significant effect for most educated individuals, with a U-shape pattern with a lowest value around 7 years of schooling.
Trust in the community people does not significantly affect the degree of social participation of this kind. Aggregate demographic variables at municipality level are not individually significant.
Most institutional factors and demographic municipality variables are not significant individually, except for SIMCE percentage variation. The negative significant effect suggests a similar interpretation we have for the community committee participation. Major inefficiency motivates citizen organization to either offset deficient public policies or to demand efficiency improvements.
The unobserved factors behind professional participation are not significantly correlated to other participation categories. Among institutional factors, the share of own revenue in total municipality revenue -as a measure of budget independence-increases the trust in community's people because greater autonomy can help local government to serve better their communities. In line with our results, Freitag (2006) argues that local government autonomy favor associative life and trust. Having a RN or PS major is also associated with greater levels of trust in the municipality. As in the previous subsection, an explanation for these facts is that RN and Socialist parties tend to allocate their best competitors in municipalities with higher levels of trust. A competing hypothesis is that those political parties have majors who advocate transparent and ethical practices causing higher trust in their municipalities. Joignant (2010) argues that both parties have a relatively decentralized organization. Finally, the estimation of hyperbolic arctangent 20 of the correlation coefficient shows that point estimates are positive for religious, parental, and community participation, but negative for professional and political categories. Only the first and last kinds show significant correlation at conventional significance levels. This evidence shows that, at least for religious and political categories, there is a substantial gain in estimating the joint model with a reduced form for the trust equation.
Transversal Issues:
Although education is regarded as a strong factor associated with SC formation, particularly in relation to trust and tolerance (van Oorschot and Finsveen 2009; 19 This arrangement is a natural response of the two largest coalitions since major elections are won by relative majority rule. Hence, if more than one candidate from one side runs for major, the chances to win for a coalition would be severely diminished. 20 The function is arctan ρ = decision-making process, consensus systems require more time and effort to make decisions due to the lower power concentration (Skelcher et al. 2011) . Supporters of the latter argue that consensus institutions provide superior representation of the citizenry segments and public policies' performance, and therefore, incentive associative life. Our results partially support this view for political participation, given the negative effect of the Herfindahl index of political consensus.
Testing Hypothesis
To test whether the eclectic approaches to explain SC formation in the literature haveempirical support, we construct and estimate various additional models, some of which are nested into the general specification we discussed above. As an alternative, we also estimate a municipality fixedeffects model, to examine whether our conclusions remain robust in this general setting (although we cannot learn how municipal characteristics affect participation and trust). This Likelihood Ratio testing is summarized in In the lower subtable, we reject the null hypothesis of independence of equations' errors by a large margin under several different specifications. Thus, allowing cross-effects between multiple types of participation and trust substantially enhances the understanding of the phenomenon. This is evidence of a multidimensional and complex process of SC formation in Chile. Diverse factors and different kinds of participation are involved in the process and interrelated in non trivial ways.
Conclusions
The purpose of this study is to achieve a better understanding of the mechanisms behind SC formation. With a novel multi-equation empirical model, we acknowledge the rich set of connections among several aspects emphasized in the literature. We apply our approach to the Chilean data, highlighting the important institutional role of municipalities. Using a utility function approach, we construct a quite general model to assess the role of individual, social and institutional factors in decision making process in which people evaluate the costs and benefits of simultaneous participation in different instances of associative life. We build and estimate the model taking into consideration important, often overlooked, aspects of identification, endogeneity, ordinal nature of variables, and interrelated decisions. We show how to introduce and test several competing or complementary hypothesis on SC formation advocated in Political Science, Sociology and Economics.
Our first finding is that a particular form of SC formation, participation in social organizations is a multidimensional and heterogeneous phenomenon. Different kinds of associative life are influenced for distinct factors in different ways. We interpret that benefits and costs of different kinds of activities exhibit a substantial interpersonal variation due to both individual and environment factors. The most relevant variables determining participation choices are gender, age, marital status, and religion. We find consistent patterns of life-cycle profiles of participation, except in the case of religious association, in which a cohort effect hypothesis cannot be ruled out.
Second, our estimates and formal statistical tests show that we cannot rule out the existence of effects in associative life of social interaction or peer's effect (Manski 1993; Durlauf 2002 ) and some political-institutional factors (Letki 2006; Freitag 2006) , both separately and jointly. The results are also robust to a more general but less informative setup using municipality fixed effects. Moreover, the results show that political-institutional factors have effects on the probability of participation, principally in the participation categories of community and political organizations, and general trust. Among the most relevant factors, we find the expenditure in social organizations at the local government level, the amount of local subsidies, the Herfindahl index of political concentration (proxy for consensus democracy at the local level), and the change or test scores in municipal schools (proxy for local government efficiency). In addition, the political party of the major (National Renovation and Socialists parties) affects political participation and trust. These puzzling findings are compatible with different hypotheses we explained above. In terms of social effects, there is a modest, yet jointly significant evidence of participation externalities, even though there are no individually significant effects of municipal averages in the reported estimates. 21 .
Third, we formally model the relationship between participation and trust, which is present all over the literature on Social Capital. There is a reverse causality issue in using one as a determinant of the other in standard statistical procedures. Hence, we try to uncover the causal effect of trust of participation using a victim crime experience as a "natural experiment" conditional on individual and municipality characteristics. The empirical strategy works well because the crime victim variable significantly reduces trust. However, the causal effect of trust is not homogeneous:
while increases the political participation intensity, it decreases the religious one.
Fourth, we directly deal with the interrelated determination of different kinds of social behaviors, instead of usual approaches constructing indices through factor analysis or similar techniques.
Prime examples gains achieved through this richer conceptual framework is that unobserved factors explaining one kind of participation and trust are useful to understand other categories. For instance, religious, parental associations, and community associations are positively correlated. The same occurs with political and professional participation intensities.
Finally, our investigation, merging several empirical and theoretical considerations in a multidimensional yet interpretable model, provides a deeper understanding of underlying mechanisms of SC formation. We hope that our work help systematize our knowledge and eases rigorously 21 Alternative specifications in the online Appendix do show some significant results for average age, age-squared and urbanity empirical testing of many theories on Social Capital formation. 
Model Likelihood
In this section, we derive the likelihood of the model. Let us develop some notation. We denote (unobserved) participation intensity of the individual n in activity j = 1, ..., J as p * j,n , and we assume it is explained by an index of exogenous variables w n and an endogenous categorical variable (trust) denoted by q. In addition, the unobserved trust intensity q * depends on the vector w n and on a vector of instrumental exogenous variable z n . All of these can be expressed by
Allowing participation and trust to be simultaneously determined, the errors of the model follow a multivariate normal distribution, which is common for all n = 1, ..., N individuals in the sample.
A Cholesky decomposition of Σ gives us linear combinations of errors denoted u = Qϵ such that QΣQ ′ = I J+1 , where I J+1 is an identity matrix of size J + 1 and Q is an upper triangular matrix.
Redefined errors u are mutually independent since E[
we can rewrite the equations (5) and (6) as
with u 1,n = ϵ 1,n u 2,n = ϵ 1,n + λ 2,2 ϵ 2,n u 3,n = ϵ 1,n + λ 3,2 ϵ 2,n + λ 3,3 ϵ 3,n ...
We observe K possible ordinal categories of participation (in our case K = 4) instead of the continuous intensities p * j,n and q * j,n . Assuming Gaussian errors, the stochastic ordinal answer of participation in activity j of individual n denoted A j,n have realizations k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}. A specific realization of ordinal response A j,n = k for participation category j by individual n occurs whenever the participation intensity is between the cuts or thresholds c j,k−1 and c j,k . Denoting d j,k,n ≡ I[A j,n = k], the probability of observing the individual n giving a particular answer k conditional on unobservable factorsũ ≡ (u 2,n , ..., u J+1,n ) is
For categories 2 to J, we have
Finally, for category J + 1 we have
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function, and θ = (α, β, γ, δ, λ) . Thresholds c j,0 = −∞, c j,K = +∞ for all j = 1, ..., J + 1. Since the components ofũ are mutually independent, the joint probability of observing a profile of ordinal responses of discrete responses, conditional oñ u is
Since the last likelihood is conditional of unobservedũ, we need to integrate out those errors
where Φ J (ũ) is a J-dimensional multivariate normal distribution with independent vector components. The integral is J-dimensional, too.
For greater details, the reader may consult Train (2009 ) or Roodman (2009 . Notes: (1) Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; (2) Robust municipality-clustered standard errors in parentheses; (3) * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; (4) avg male and similar variables with indicate the municipality average of the variable, (CASEN 2006 and ; (5) "crime vic" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the interviewed person has been a crime victim during the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise; (6) LL is the log likelihood of the model. Notes: (1) Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; (2) Robust municipality-clustered standard errors in parentheses; (3) * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; (4)"crime vic" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the interviewed person has been a crime victim during the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise; (6) LL is the log likelihood of the model. Notes: (1) Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; (2) Robust municipality-clustered standard errors in parentheses; (3) * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; (4) "crime vic" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the interviewed person has been a crime victim during the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise; (6) LL is the log likelihood of the model. Notes: (1) Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100; (2) Robust municipality-clustered standard errors in parentheses; (3) * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; (4) "crime vic" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the interviewed person has been a crime victim during the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise; (6) LL is the log likelihood of the model.
